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Outline
• The challenge of low-carbon innovation
• Can we learn from past energy transitions & 
policies?
– The British Industrial Revolution(s)
“A lantern on the stern can help with navigation 
ahead” (Horrell)
• The potential role of General Purpose 
Technologies
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A Third, Low-Carbon „Industrial Revolution‟?
• How to get there from here?
– Means more than substituting a few low carbon technologies into 
existing uses & institutions
• Low carbon technologies need capacity:
• To be widely used & diffused
• For continuous innovation & cost reduction
• To change what we do with them & how
• A role for General Purpose Technologies (GPTs)?
– Such as smart grids (electricity & ICT)
– But GPTs take time to develop
– May be slowed by path dependence, lock-in and Sailing Ship/Last Gasp 
Effects 
– Are contested – empirically & theoretically
• Relative prices and resources
– If Allen‟s (2009) message about 1st Industrial Revolution holds for this 
Revolution, where are the relative prices & physical &human resources 
needed for risky innovation?
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Perspective on Energy System Transitions
• Energy systems are complex evolutionary 
entities
• Transitions mean interactions between
– Fuels & energy converting technologies
– Infrastructures (transport networks, pipes & 
wires…)
– Institutions (markets, companies, finance…)
– Policy regimes (institutions, bureaux, 
regulations…)
– Economic variables (prices, income/output…)
– Environment & resources
– And people…
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Energy & Britain‟s 1st „Industrial Revolution‟: 
C16th-19th Energy Transitions
• From a traditional agricultural economy, with limited
– Productivity of scarce land & flows of energy 
– For food, clothing, housing & fuel
• To a new regime: growth &welfare transformed by
– Using fossil fuel stock (coal) for larger energy flows
• With innovations including
• Steam engine
• Cotton mills
• Substitution of coal for wood in metal manufacture
• Other social, political, institutional & technological changes 
• Coal & steam helped drive mechanisation, urbanisation 
& Britain‟s „Industrial Revolution‟
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Woodfuels
Coal
Fig. 1: UK Final Energy 
Consumption, 1500-1800 (TWh)
1650: equal 
shares of wood-
fuels & coal
Fouquet & Pearson (2003) World Economics, 4(3)
Coal use grew: 
woodfuel stable
The rise and fall of coal for final uses
Fig. 2: UK Final Energy 
Consumption, 1800-2000 (TWh)
Depletion fears: 
Jevons, The Coal 
Question (1865)
1913: coal output 
& jobs peaked
Coal
Petrol
-eum
Gas
Elec
• Allen, 2009: British Industrial Revolution - wages high, energy & capital 
cheap, relative to other countries in Europe & Asia
• Innovations in steam engines & cotton mills & substitution of coal/coke 
for wood in metal manufacturing uniquely profitable in Britain
Fouquet & Pearson (2003) World Economics, 4(3)
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Energy price falling:
1550-1850
Energy intensity rising: 
1550-1850 
Fig. 3: Energy 
intensity & prices 
Inverse relationship 
between:
UK energy intensity 
(E/GDP)
and
Real energy prices 
(p/kWh)
Fouquet & Pearson (2003) World Economics, 4(3)
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Source: authors ’ own estimates – see Sections II.2 and II.3 Billion: 10 9 (i.e. one thousand million)
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Lighting
Candles Kerosene
Gas
Electricity
Fouquet & Pearson (2006) Energy Journal, Vol. 27(1)
Fig. 4. UK Energy Service Transitions: Lighting – use of 
Candles, Gas, Kerosene & Electricity (1700-2000) 
By 2000: lighting costs fell to 1/3000 of 
1800 cost;  per cap. use rose 6500-fold
Electricity slow to match 
gas cost (1880-1920)
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Fig. 5. Efficiency of UK energy 
technologies, 1500-2000
(index: 1900=100)
Fouquet & Pearson (2007), IAEE conference, Wellington
Fig. 6. Cost of consumer 
energy services, 1500-2000
Fig. 7. Energy services consumed, 
1500-2000
Other Energy Services
See also: Fouquet (2008), Heat, Power and Light, E. Elgar
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C18: coal & new steam technologies
• Newcomen „atmospheric‟ beam engines pumped 
water from coal & copper mines (>100 by 1733)
• Boulton & Watt‟s „separate condenser‟ patent 
(1769-1800)
– raised  efficiency & profits 
• Watt (1782) & others developed rotary steam 
power 
– could now drive machines
• But slow penetration
– by 1800, only 2200 engines in mining & manufacturing
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• High steam/water power price differential slowly 
overcome
– By steam‟s mobility advantage
– More engine efficiency, from
• Higher pressure compound boilers (1840s); Corliss 
valves (1860s)
• Steam let production move from water & wind power 
sites
– Helped develop the factory system
– Especially textiles: Manchester - „Cottonopolis‟
• Railways & then ships & trade
– Developed national & international transport & markets
Steam Power: Development & Diffusion
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A Long-Run Perspective
• New technology diffusion took time
– Major productivity fx. of steam engines, locomotives & 
ships servable after 1850 (Crafts…)
– Few steam-intensive industries
• 1800-1900: mining, textiles & metal manufactures
• Accounted for >50% industrial steam power, 
• Not just steam: electric light slow to dominate gas 
(40 years: 1880-1920)
• Energy system inertia
– First mover advantage & path dependence?
• Mining & textile  industries 1st with steam but slow 
with electricity in 2nd C19 Industrial Revolution
• Relative to chemicals & engineering, shipbuilding & 
vehicles
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Some Lessons from UK Energy Transitions 
• Transitions have profound effects on economy, 
welfare & environment
– But took multiple decades for measurable growth 
effects to appear
• Evidence shows government can make a 
difference
• But past transitions weren‟t managed
• Modern transitions could be faster – but still takes 
time
– To build new enthusiasm, infrastructure & institutions
– To escape the shackles of path dependence
– Overcome „lock-in‟ & turn over old capital stock
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Fig.8: Turning over the Capital Stock takes Time…
• Thompson‟s Atmospheric 
Beam Engine
– Ran for 127 years in 
coal mines (1791-1918)
• Bell Crank Engine
– Rotary power: ran 120 
years (1810-1930)
• Both in Science Museum, 
London
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The Future for Low Carbon Energy Systems?
• Two previous UK Industrial Revolutions were about 
manufacturing
– C18 revolution driven by textiles, iron & steam
– end C19 2nd revolution: electricity, chemicals, petroleum 
& mass production
• Improved technology (energy & ICT, might help 
break link between energy services, fuel demands 
& CO2 emissions
– Energy & ICT e.g. in smart grids) as General Purpose 
Technologies
– Could enhance macro-level productivity
• A 3rd „Industrial Revolution‟?
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General Purpose Technologies
• Three key features:
– Pervasiveness: have a broad range of general 
applications/purposes
– Technological Dynamism: continuous innovation in the 
technology - costs fall/quality rises
– Innovational Complementarities: innovation in application 
sectors – users improve own technologies, find new uses
• The penetration of a GPT in an economy involves a long 
acclimatization phase
– In which other technologies, forms of organization, institutions & 
consumption patterns adapt to the new GPT
• Steam engines, ICE, electrification & ICT given as 
examples
– raised productivity growth - but took decades
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The hypothesis of the Sailing Ship Effect
• Hypothesis: the advent of a competing new technology may 
stimulate innovation in an incumbent technology
– for some mature technologies, in some circumstances 
• This „Sailing Ship effect‟/ „Last Gasp Effect‟ makes the 
incumbent technology more efficient and competitive
• Before being ultimately superseded by the successor 
technology
• Cited SSE/LGE examples include:
– Improvements in sailing ships after the introduction of the 
steam ship in late C19
– The response of gas lighting, via the Welsbach incandescent 
mantle, to the 1880s arrival of the incandescent lamp
– The response of carburettors to the introduction of electronic 
fuel ignition in the 1980s (Snow)
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Castaldi & Nuvolari (2003)
• Reviews GPT by applying it to 19th century steam power 
development 
• Economic  impact of stationary steam technology not 
significant until mid-19th century
• The GPT model has three limitations.
– Doesn‟t capture the “local” aspect of accumulation of 
technological knowledge
– Doesn‟t take into account the interdependency among different 
technological trajectories (because it focuses on one particular 
technology as opposed to “constellations of major technical 
innovations”). 
– Technical change takes place in an environment of high 
uncertainty which is not in line with neoclassical models of 
economic analysis (on which the GPT model is based), that 
assume perfectly informed rational agents and equilibrium. 
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Edquist and Henrekson (2006)
• Explore the impact of the steam engine, electrification 
& ICT – on productivity growth
• Finds that major technological breakthroughs affect 
aggregate productivity growth
– but slowly: 140 years for the steam engine, 40-50 years for 
electrification & ICT
• Each technological breakthrough offers a different 
lesson
• There is a complex interdependence between 
different technologies
– ICT presupposed an extensive electricity network
– Steam was used as a primary source for producing 
electricity.
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But what if the 
incumbent‟s 
experience curve 
shifts downwards?
Through 
SSE/LGE and/or 
fossil fuel prices?
Bigger learning 
investment needed
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Potential Significance of the Sailing Ship Effect 
Hypothesis for Lower Carbon Transitions & Policy
• Significantly increased (price/quality) competitiveness of incumbents, 
through „sailing ship‟ effects & fossil fuel price shifts, could :
– Slow newcomers‟ sales
– Delay their travel down experience curves
– As they chase incumbents‟ shifting experience curves
– Slowing the transition by restraining penetration rates (McVeigh et al.)
– And raising policy costs via higher subsidies needed for competitive 
penetration
– While forecasts that don‟t allow for „sailing ship‟ effects could 
overestimate penetration
• So, appreciating sailing ship effects/Last Gasps matters, where there 
are mature technologies and we seek radical innovation
• And suggests giving proper attention to dynamic interactions between 
new and incumbent technologies
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A Third, Low-Carbon „Industrial Revolution‟?
• How to get there from here?
– Means more than substituting a few low carbon technologies into 
existing uses & institutions
• Low carbon technologies need capacity:
• To be widely used & diffused
• For continuous innovation & cost reduction
• To change what we do with them & how
• A role for General Purpose Technologies (GPTs)?
– Such as smart grids (electricity & ICT)
– But GPTs take time to develop
– May be slowed by path dependence, lock-in and Sailing Ship/Last Gasp 
Effects 
– Are contested – empirically & theoretically
• Relative prices and resources
– If Allen‟s (2009) message about 1st Industrial Revolution holds for the Low 
Carbon Revolution, 
– where are the relative prices and physical and human resources needed to 
drive risky innovation?
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